Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National Survey by Borth, Scott J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 58 Number 3 
7-1-1983 
Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building 
Permits: A National Survey 
Scott J. Borth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Construction Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott J. Borth, Comment, Municipal Tort Liability for Erroneous Issuance of Building Permits: A National 
Survey, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 537 (1983). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol58/iss3/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY FOR ERRONEOUS
ISSUANCE OF BUILDING PERMITS: A
NATIONAL SURVEY
Preston Construction Company (Preston) is a well-known development
and construction firm in Daniellville, a hypothetical incorporated munici-
pality.' In 1982, Preston acquired a lot in downtown Daniellville on
which it planned to construct a five-story office building.
Preston submitted a plot plan and building permit application in order
to begin construction. Daniellville has set fifty feet as the minimum right-
of-way along access streets such as First Avenue. The existing right-of-
way along First Avenue abutting the Preston lot is only thirty feet. Even
though Preston's application failed to provide for a sufficient setback, 2
the building permit was approved and Preston began construction.
As required by the building code, Preston requested a foundation and
setback inspection upon completion of the foundation. An inspector ex-
amined the construction and approved the foundation and setback. Pres-
ton continued construction for several weeks at considerable expense be-
fore the improper setback was brought to the attention of the
municipality. Daniellville promptly issued a stop-work order and directed
Preston to relocate the building to provide for the proper setback.
Preston brought suit alleging that Daniellville was negligent in ad-
ministering its building and zoning codes and demanded compensation
for the relocation of the building. In its answer, Daniellville raised the
absolute defense of governmental immunity. 3 In the alternative, Daniell-
ville asserted that the duty established in zoning and building codes runs
only to the public as a whole and not to any particular individual. 4 There-
fore, Daniellville breached no duty upon which Preston could recover.
Actions alleging municipal tort liability for negligent administration of
building and zoning codes are part of the current judicial and legislative
trend to abolish municipal tort immunity. In surveying how such actions
are treated, this Comment briefly examines the historical background of
1. The facts used in this hypothetical are drawn from J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 29 Wn.
App. 942, 631 P.2d 1002 (1981), review granted, 97 Wn. 2d 1001 (1982).
2. The plot plan and building permit application submitted by Preston provided for a 10-foot
setback from the existing right-of-way rather than the 20 feet required.
3. In addition, Danieliville would probably assert that the issuance of building permits is a dis-
cretionary function and is therefore immune from tort liability. See infra notes 40-44 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of the discretionary function exception).
4. This defense is commonly referred to as the public duty doctrine. This nomenclature, how-
ever, is misleading. It implies that this defense is unique to governmental tortfeasors. Rather, this
defense is a basic tenet of tort law. See infra Part III. This Comment, nonetheless, will refer to this
defense as the public duty doctrine in the interests of simplicity.
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governmental immunity. It then categorizes the states according to the
scope of governmental tort immunity currently recognized. 5 After estab-
lishing these categories, this Comment applies the law under each cate-
gory to the facts of Preston v. City of Danieliville, the hypothetical case. 6
It then analyzes the public duty defense raised by the municipality, focus-
ing on the origin of the defense and on its continued use as a municipal
defense to negligence actions. This Comment concludes by recommend-
ing one type of governmental tort claims act which best balances the equi-
ties between the injured individual and the municipality.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
The doctrine of governmental tort immunity or sovereign immunity de-
veloped from the ancient maxim rex non potest peccare ("the King can
do no wrong"). 7 The first judicial extension of this immunity to a local
governmental entity was in Russell v. Men of Devon. 8 The Russell rule
was introduced in the United States in 18129 and was soon adopted by
most of the courts in the United States. 10
5. Although this Comment focuses on municipal tort liability, cases involving the tort liability of
other governmental entities will be discussed where applicable. Thus, "municipality" will encom-
pass other local governmental entities, such as counties.
6. This Comment will focus on those categories which do not expressly bar an action for negli-
gent administration of building and zoning codes.
7. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01, at 436 (1958) (quoting W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES (10th ed. 1887)); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1963).
It has been suggested that the meaning traditionally ascribed to the maxim was an ironic perversion
of its original intent, which was to create a means of equitable relief against the King. Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1924). The maxim, nonetheless, was broadly
construed to prohibit suits against the sovereign. See Jaffe, supra, at 4.
8. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). In Russell, the House of Lords granted immu-
nity to an unincorporated political subdivision because of the lack of a fund from which to collect the
judgment and the injustice of imposing liability on the individual defendants. Id. at 668, 100 Eng.
Rep. at 360. At the time of Russell, the concept of a municipal corporation was relatively new, and
the suit was actually against the entire population of the county. The House of Lords reasoned, there-
fore, that because the population of the county was constantly fluctuating, it would be unjust to im-
pose liability on innocent parties. Id. The court, however, failed to explain its requirement of a par-
ticular fund from which to pay the judgment. Id. at 672-73, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. See generally W.
PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS 978 (4th ed. 1971) (discussion of Russell); Barnett, The Foundations of the
Distinction Between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of
Municipal Corporations, 16 OR L. REV. 250,264 (1937) (same).
9. Mower v. The Inhabitants of Leister, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusettes followed Russell even though "the only similarity between the situation[s] ... lay in
the fact that the defendants were counties." Borchard, supra note 7, at 42.
10. James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv 610,
621-23 (1955).
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Although the early cases introducing governmental tort immunity
lacked a sound analytic framework,11 courts evolved justifications in sub-
sequent case law. Courts justified municipal tort immunity on the follow-
ing grounds: (1) a municipality derives no pecuniary benefit from the ex-
ercise of public functions; (2) the doctrine of respondeat superior is
inapplicable because municipal officers and employees are agents of the
state and not of the municipality when exercising public governmental
duties; (3) taxes raised for the public good should not be diverted to the
payment of private losses; and (4) a municipality should not be held liable
for torts committed in the performance of duties imposed on it by the
legislature. 12
To alleviate the sometimes harsh results produced by municipal tort
immunity, the courts created numerous exceptions. 13 The most prevalent
exception was the governmental/proprietary dichotomy. 14 Under this di-
chotomy, courts first categorized municipal functions as either "govern-
mental" or "proprietary": if the function fell in the latter category, the
municipality was treated as a private corporation and held liable for its
torts to the same extent as a private corporation; if the function fell in the
former category, the municipality was treated as an arm of the state, and
was entitled to share the immunity traditionally accorded the sovereign.
The test frequently used to categorize municipal functions was whether
the activity was designed to benefit the general public rather than merely
the municipality. 15 If the activity benefited the general public, then it was
classified as governmental. This nebulous test allowed courts to engage in
arbitrary line drawing as they attempted to categorize specific municipal
activities. This confusion resulted in "great inequities and incongruities"
in municipal tort liability, and provided much of the impetus for the cur-
rent movement to restrict or abolish the doctrine of municipal tort immu-
nity. 16
11. See supra notes 7-8.
12. E.g., Hagerman v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 697, 66 P.2d 1152, 1154 (1937). See generally
W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 978 (discussing the rationales commonly asserted in support of munici-
pal immunity).
13. For example, a municipality could be held liable if it created or maintained a nuisance, even
in the course of a "governmental" function. See, e.g., Lund v. Seattle, 99 Wash. 300, 169 P. 820
(1928) (city liable to claimant who fell over wire fence which the city had allowed to be constructed
in the street).
14. The governmental/proprietary dichotomy originated in 1842 in Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill
531 (N.Y. 1842). See generally 18 E. McQutLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.02,
at 104-05 (3d. ed. rev. 1977) (discussing the development of the governmentalproprietary dicho-
tomy).
15. See 18 E. McQUiLLN, supra note 14, § 53.24.
16. Id. at 105. Commentators generally agree that the govenmental/proprietary dichotomy is
"one of the most unsatisfactory known to the law." 3 K. DAvis, supra note 7, § 25.07, at 460. See,
e.g., Borchard, supra note 7, at 135-36; Barnett, supra note 8, at 269-70.
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II. CLASSIFICATION OF STATES ACCORDING TO THE SCOPE
OF MUNICIPAL TORT IMMUNITY
The modem trend in most states is to waive, to some degree, the tort
immunity previously enjoyed by its political subdivisions.17 The states,
however, follow diverse approaches to municipal tort liability. At one
end of the spectrum are states that retain traditional municipal tort immu-
nity, subject only to isolated statutory waivers. 1 8 At the other end of the
spectrum are states that have adopted a blanket or unqualified waiver of
municipal tort immunity. 19 In these states a municipality is liable for its
torts "to the same extent as if [it] were a private person or corpora-
tion. "20 Between these two polar extremes are states that have adopted
either a closed-ended or an open-ended tort claims act. A closed-ended
approach establishes general municipal immunity with an extensive list of
exceptions. 21 An open-ended approach, on the other hand, makes a muni-
cipality generally liable but provides for specific immune activities. 22
A. Traditional Governmental Tort Immunity
Thirteen states have retained the traditional common law notion that a
municipality is immune from tort liability.2 3 These states, however,
maintain the governmental/proprietary dichotomy when determining mu-
17. See infra note 22 (table listing the humber of states which have abolished or modified munici-
pal tort immunity).
18. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (1981).
21. See infra notes 29 & 32-34 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. In summary form, the categories of states are
as follows:
CATEGORY NUMBER OF STATES
A. Traditional Immunity ....... ............................ 11
B. Closed-Ended ......... ................................ 11
C. Open-Ended ......... ................................. 13
D. Blanket Waiver ......... ............................... 15
23. Jackson v. Smith, 309 So. 2d 520 (Miss. 1975); Rich v. Goldsboro, 282 N.C. 383, 192
S.E.2d 824 (1972); Frazier v. Alum Crest, 48 Ohio App. 2d 283, 357 N.E.2d 407 (1976); Belue v.
City of Spartanburg, 276 S.C. 381, 280 S.E.2d 49, 50 (1981); Conway v. Humbert, 82 S.D. 317,
145 N.W.2d 524 (1966); Dugan v. Town of Burlington, 135 Vt. 303, 375 A.2d 991, 992 (1977);
Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 266 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901
(1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § IB (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.996(107) (Supp. 1981); N.H.
REV STAT ANN. § 507-B:5 (Supp. 1979).
Included within this category are states which have enacted minor statutory exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of municipal immunity. The most common is liability for negligent operation of motor vehi-
cles. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2903 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § IB(b) (1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:2 (Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-230 (Supp. 1979).
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nicipal tort liability.24 In these states, therefore, Preston's recovery of
monetary damages turns on whether the issuance of building permits is a
governmental or a proprietary function.
Courts have taken numerous approaches in determining whether a par-
ticular activity is governmental.25 Regardless of the approach taken,
courts have generally classified issuance of permits as a governmental ac-
tivity. 26 The rationale most often asserted is that the purpose of building
permits is to force compliance with building and zoning codes for the
welfare of the community.27 In these states, therefore, Preston would not
recover monetary damages for erroneous issuance of a building permit
unless the municipality had waived its immunity. 28
24. See 18 E. McQuiLuN, supra note 14, §§ 53.23, .24. Two states have codified the govern-
mental/proprietary dichotomy. See MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.996(107) (Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. §
21-15-6 (Supp. 1982).
25. One common test is to classify as governmental those functions and activities which only a
municipality can adequately perform. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 131, at 979-81. Another
common test is to determine whether the activity is to benefit the general public rather than merely the
municipality. See 18 E. McQuILuN, supra note 14, § 53.24.
26. See, e.g., E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 252 A.2d 824 (1969); Irvine v.
Montgomery County, 239 Md. 113, 210 A.2d 359 (1965); Key Petroleum, Inc. v. Housing Au41,,
357 So. 2d 920 (Miss. 1978); Hermer v. Dover, 106 N.H. 534, 215 A.2d 693 (1965); Lockwood v.
Village of Buchanan, 18 Misc. 2d 862, 182 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Westchester County Ct. 1959); Linde-
mann v. City of Kenosha, 206 Wis. 364, 240 N.W. 373 (1932). See generally 9 E. McQUILULr,
supra note 14, § 26.200 (permit issuance is a governmental function).
27. See 9 E. McQuiLLN, supra note 14, § 26.200; 7 id. § 24.507. For example, in E. Eyring &
Sons Co. v. Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 252 A.2d 824 (1969), an action was brought against the city
after the collapse of a church roof which resulted in numerous injuries to the worshippers. The plain-
tiff alleged that the city's Bureau of Building Inspection had failed to properly inspect and supervise
the construction of the church to insure compliance with the applicable provisions of the building
code. The court applied a three-part test to determine whether the enforcement of building codes is a
governmental function:
(I) Is the act in question sanctioned by legislative authority?
(2) Is the act solely for the public benefit with no profit inuring to the municipality?
(3) Does the act tend to benefit the public health and welfare? Id. at 825.
Applying this test, the court first found that the acts of the Bureau were sanctioned by legislative
authority. Id. at 826. Second, the court held that although the Bureau charged a fee for permits, it was
not engaged in a profit-making business because the fee was designed to only cover the estimated
costs of the services. Id. Finally, the court held that the benefits of building regulations do not inure to
private individuals but rather to the general public. Id. The court concluded that the issuance of
building permits and inspections for compliance were purely governmental functions for which the
city was immune from tort liability. Id.
28. In several states, a municipality waives its immunity if it has purchased liability insurance
covering the activity, but only to the extent of the insurance. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 21-15-6
(Supp. 1982); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 412:3 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1976);
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 9-12-7 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1403 (Supp. 1982). Three reasons
have been given for why a municipality would buy insurance: (1) to cover proprietary functions and
those areas in which immunity never existed; (2) to provide for a secure working environment for
municipal employees by removing the threat of personal liability; and (3) to protect the public from
harm. Harper, Statutory Waiver of Municipal Immunity Upon Purchase of Liability Insurance in
North Carolina and the MunicipalLiability Crisis, 4 CAMPBELL L. REv. 41, 72 (1981).
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B. Closed-Ended Governmental Tort Claims Acts
Eleven states have enacted legislation that makes municipalities gener-
ally immune from tort liability subject to an extensive list of exceptions. 29
Under this approach, immunity is the rule and liability the exception.
This approach prevents courts from accepting "novel causes of action
against public entities." 30 Therefore, an action against a municipality al-
leging negligent issuance of a building permit would be barred unless an
exception encompassed such an action. In the absence of an exception,
Preston could not recover monetary damages. 31
In five of these states, the statutory declaration of immunity is followed
by an exception creating governmental liability for tortious acts or omis-
sions of employees committed within the scope of their employment. 32
This provision is broad enough to permit a claim against the municipality
for negligent administration of building and zoning codes. These states,
however, have enacted extensive statutory limits on this broad waiver of
immunity. One such limit provides that a public entity is immune from
liability for an injury caused by the issuance or revocation of any per-
mit. 33 This exception represents a legislative decision to encourage per-
29. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106 (1982); DEL CODE
ANN tit. 10, § 4011 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103 (1980); NEB. REV. STAT §
23-2401 (1977); N.J. STAT ANN § 59:1-2 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2 (1978); TENN
CODE ANN § 29-20-201 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-30-3 (1968); Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-i04 (Supp. 1980).
30. N.J. STAT ANN. § 59:2-1 comment (West 1982). This objective is accomplished by mandat-
ing that courts use an analytical approach which first asks "whether an immunity applies and if not,
should liability attach." Id. (emphasis omitted). See, e.g., Ritchie v. Cahall, 386 F. Supp. 1207,
1209 (D.N.J. 1974) (immunity of public entity, rather than liability is the general rule); Holt v. Utah
State Road Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973) (governmental immunity is the rule with the
listed liabilities construed narrowly in favor of the state).
31. This would be the result in Colorado, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico, Texas, and Wyom-
ing.
In addition, Delaware and Maine each have statutory provisions whereby a governmental entity is
expressly granted immunity when granting or revoking any permit. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §
401 l(b)(2) (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 14, § 8103(2)(B) (1980).
32. The New Jersey statute, for example, provides that: "a public entity is liable for injury proxi-
mately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." N.J. STAT.
ANN § 59:2-2(a) (West 1982). Accord CAL. GOVT CODE § 815.2 (West 1980); NEB. REV. STAT §§
23-2402(4), -2407 (1977); TENN CODE ANN § 29-20-205 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10
(Supp. 1981). In this respect, these statutes resemble an open-ended approach. See infra note 36.
33. The New Jersey statute is typical:
A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, suspension or revoca-
tion of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, license, certifi-
cate, approval, order, or similar authorization where the public entity or public employee is
authorized by law to determine whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied,
suspended or revoked.
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mit issuance and enforcement by preventing tort liability.34 Based on this
legislative mandate, courts have refused to impose liability on municipal-
ities for negligent issuance of building permits .35
Therefore, in states adopting a closed-ended tort claims act, Preston
could not recover for erroneous issuance of a building permit unless there
is an express waiver of statutory immunity.
C. Open-Ended Governmental Tort Claims Acts
Thirteen states have enacted legislation that waives governmental
immunity subject to numerous specific exceptions. 36 The open-ended ap-
proach differs from the closed-ended approach in two ways. First, by
making liability the rule and immunity the exception, the open-ended ap-
proach affords a municipality less protection. Second, the open-ended ap-
proach shifts the power to delineate the scope of municipal tort liability to
the judiciary.
Under the open-ended approach, the burden is on the governmental
tortfeasor to establish that the claim is covered by one of the specific
grants of immunity. 37 The battleground between claimants and govern-
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-5 (West 1982). Accord CAL. Gov-r CODE § 818.4 (West 1980); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-20-205 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(3) (Supp. 1981).
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-5 comment (West 1982).
35. This provision has been construed as an absolute immunity to suit. See, e.g., McGowan v.
Borough of Eatontown, 151 N.J. Super. 440, 376 A.2d 1327, 1331 (1977) (state immune from suit
alleging improper approval of construction of a driveway); Davis v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville,
620 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. App. 1981) (no legal grounds for plaintiff's action alleging negligent
enforcement of zoning ordinance).
Interestingly, California courts have held that the licensing immunity is a specific application of
discretionary immunity and therefore does not preclude liability if issuance or revocation of the per-
mit is a nondiscretionary ministerial act. See Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d
606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1977), Slagle Const. Co. v. Contra Costa County, 67 Cal. App. 3d 559,
136 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1977).
36. The Oklahoma statute waiving governmental immunity is typical: "Each political subdivi-
sion of this state shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts or the torts of its employees acting
within the scope of their employment or duties subject to the limitations specified in this act." OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 153 (West Supp. 1982). Accord ALAsKA STAT. § 9.65.070 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO
CODE § 6-903(a) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-16.5 (Bums Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.2 (West Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
75-6103 (Supp. 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 466.02 (West 1977); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-102 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (1967);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265 (1981).
37. The immunities commonly granted in open-ended tort claims acts can be broken down into
two general categories. The first category contains the traditional exceptions from governmental lia-
bility. This category includes immunity for acts and omissions constituting the exercise of a legisla-
tive or judicial function, or constituting the exercise of a discretionary function. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 9.65.070(d)(2) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 6-904(1) (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
16.5-3(5)-(8) (Bums Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(a)-(d) (Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 258, § 10(a), (b) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 466-03(5), (6) (West
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mental defendants, therefore, focuses on the construction of these excep-
tions. Five of these states specifically immunize a municipality from
claims arising from the issuance or revocation of any permit. 38 Preston
could not recover from a municipality in these states. 39
In the states that do not expressly bar an action against a public entity
for erroneous issuance of building permits, the municipality is subject to
liability unless another exception covers the conduct. The exception most
commonly asserted by municipalities is that issuance of building permits
is a discretionary function. 40 Under this exception, a municipality is im-
mune from tort liability if the negligence arises out of a discretionary act
by an official charged with formulating government policy. 41 This excep-
1977); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-9-111 to -114 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.032 (1967); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-12.1-03(3) (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(1)-(5) (West Supp. 1980); OR.
REV STAT § 30.265(3)(c)(1981).
The second category contains exceptions describing circumstances where no duty is owed by the
governmental entity or representing legislative policy determinations that certain activities should be
encouraged rather than discouraged by the threat of civil tort liability. For example, some states
provide immunity for "failure to provide, or the method of providing, police or fire protection."
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(m) (Supp. 1982). Another exception in this category is immunity for
inspecting property. See ALASKA STAT. § 9.65.070(d)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
85, § 2-105 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(11) (Bums Supp. 1982).
38. See ALASKA STAT. § 9.65.070(d)(3) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT ch. 85, § 2-104 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); IND CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-3(10) (Bums Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-
03(3)(b) (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(12) (West Supp. 1982).
This exception describes a circumstance where no duty is owed by the governmental entity to an
individual member of the public. This exception also represents a legislative policy determination
that permit issuance and enforcement should be encouraged rather than discouraged by the threat of
civil tort liability. See supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., U-Haul Co. v. Town of Cicero, 410 N.E.2d 286 (I11. App. 1980) (city immune
from action alleging that a special use permit was improperly denied causing the plaintiff monetary
damages from delayed operation of business).
40. Most open-ended states have codified a discretionary function exception. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 6-904(1) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6104(d) (Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
258, § 10(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); MINN. STAT ANN. § 466-03(6) (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41.032(2) (1967); OR. REV STAT. § 30.265(3)(c) (1981).
41. There are currently two lines of analysis defining the scope of the discretionary function
exception. One line of analysis makes a distinction between the "planning" and "operational"
levels of decisionmaking by governmental entities. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 782, 447
P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County,
371 So. 2d 1010, 1021 (Fla. 1979). This planning/operational test focuses on the status of the deci-
sionmaker rather than on the type of the decision. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
The other line of analysis focuses on the type of decision made, rather than on the decisionmaker.
See Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wn. 2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440, 445
(1965). The Evangelical court proposed a four-part test to draw a line that would preserve immunity
for "truly discretionary" functions:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic governmental
policy, program, or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment
of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or
direction of the policy, program, or objective?
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tion is intended to prevent a court from substituting its judgment for that
of the legislature or executive. 42 A public entity, however, is liable for
torts arising out of a ministerial act which involves policy execution as
opposed to policy formulation. Drawing the line between discretionary
and ministerial functions has been a fertile ground of conflict. 43 Not sur-
prisingly, the case law is split on whether the issuance of building permits
is a discretionary function. 44
Despite the broad waiver of immunity in open-ended tort claims acts,
courts are reluctant to impose municipal tort liability for injuries arising
out of certain municipal activities, even though the conduct is not immu-
nized by statute. 45 Courts often use the public duty doctrine to limit mu-
nicipal tort liability.46 This doctrine provides that a municipality, or any
governmental entity, performing certain public functions owes a duty
only to the general public and not to any particular individual. 47 Any
claim against the municipality alleging negligent performance of one of
these functions, therefore, is dismissed because of the absence of a legal
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise or basic policy evaluation, judg-
ment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or
lawful authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision?
Id. at 255,407 P.2d at 445. Each question must be answered in the affirmative if the act, omission, or
decision is to be classified as a discretionary governmental process. Id.
A full discussion of the discretionary function exception is beyond the scope of this Comment.
42. See Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 67 Wn. 2d 246, 254, 407 P.2d
440,444 (1965).
43. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648 n.31 (1979) (noting that, much like the
governmental/proprietary dichotomy in the sovereign immunity doctrine, the line between discretion-
ary and ministerial functions is difficult to discern).
44. Compare Wilcox Assocs. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 603 P.2d 903, 905 (Alaska 1979)
(approval of permit is discretionary), Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 44 Md. App. 79, 407
A.2d 1151, 1169 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981) (issuance of permit involves the exer-
cise of governmental discretion and therefore no tort liability will lie against the governmental en-
tity), Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 287 Minn. 287, 178 N.W.2d 215, 217 (1970) (same), Fiduc-
cia v. Summit Hill Const. Co., 109 N.J. Super. 249, 262 A.2d 920, 922 (1970) (same), and Ilson v.
Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach, 79 A.D.2d 697, 434 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274-75, (1980) (grant or
denial of building permit is a discretionary function and a municipality is not liable for monetary
damages) with Central Advertising Co. v. City of St. Joseph, 107 Mich. App. 488, 309 N.W.2d 613,
614 (1981) (issuance of building permits is a ministerial function), J. Gregcin, Inc. v. City of Day-
ton, 39 Or. App. 743, 593 P.2d 1231, 1233 (1979) (same), and Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn.
2d 607, 547 P.2d 1221, 1228-29 (1976) (same). See generally 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 15, §
53.22(e) (noting the lack of state case law on the issue of whether issuance of permits is a discretion-
ary function).
45. See, e.g., Hannon v. Counihan, 54 111. App. 3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917, 922 (1977) (failure of
municipality to properly enforce building codes did not give rise to a cause of action); Cracraft v. City
of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1979) (municipality not liable for negligent inspec-
tion because no common law duty to inspect and correct the fire code violations of a third person).
46. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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duty owed to the claimant. Therefore, even without a provision granting
tort immunity to governmental entities for permit issuance, Preston might
not recover damages in an open-ended tort claims state.
D. Blanket Waivers of Governmental Immunity
Fifteen states have abolished the traditional doctrine of governmental
immunity without listing specific qualifications. 48 In general, the aboli-
tion of governmental immunity occurred in either of two ways. In most of
these states the judiciary abolished the doctrine because of dissatisfaction
with the archaic justifications for governmental immunity. 49 After judi-
cial abolition of governmental immunity, the legislatures failed to take
affirmative action addressing the scope of governmental tort liability. 50 In
a few of these states, the legislature initiated the change from governmen-
tal immunity by adopting a tort claims act. These acts make municipali-
ties "liable for damages arising out of their tortious conduct . . . to the
same extent as if they were a private person or corporation." 51
Under either approach, the judiciary is left with the task of defining the
scope of governmental liability on a case-by-case basis. Courts have ex-
perienced great difficulty, however, in resolving the proper scope of gov-
ernmental liability. This has resulted in extensive and expensive litigation
as claimants continually test the scope of governmental tort liability. 52
48. See infra notes 49 & 51.
49. See Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Lane v. Yama-
moto, 2 Hawaii Ct. App. 176, 628 P.2d 634, 636 (1981) (municipality liable on respondeat superior
doctrine); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Board of Comm'rs of the Port of
New Orleans v. Splendour Shipping & Enterprises Co., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973); Jones v. State
Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Ed., 453 Pa.
584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W.Va. 1975); Holytz v. City
of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
50. Several legislatures, however, did enact statutory limits on the amount recoverable. See,
e.g.. KY REv. STAT. ANN § 44.070 (Baldwin 1980) (no recovery for pain and suffering; single claim
not to exceed $50,000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.82 (West Supp. 1982) (recovery limited to
$250,000).
51. WASH REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (1981). Accord ALA. CODE § 11-93-1(5) (Supp. 1982); CONN.
GEN STAT ANN. § 7-465 (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(1) (West Supp. 1982); GA.
CODE ANN. § 69-301 (1976) (codified discretionary/ministerial dichotomy); N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8
(1963) (state waiver of immunity); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 53 (1972) (county liable to same extent as
state): R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-I (Supp. 1982). In addition to the blanket waiverof immunity, several
legislatures have placed statutory limits on the amount recoverable. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-93-2
(Supp. 1982) ($ 100,000 for one person and a single occurrence); FLA STAT ANN. § 768.28(5) (West
Supp. 1981) ($100,000 for one person); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-2 (Supp. 1982) ($50,000 limit).
52. The underlying problem of the blanket-waiver approach is essentially two-fold. First, unlike
closed-ended statutes, there are no clear and definite guidelines for a court to follow. See supra notes
29-35 and accompanying text. Second, the courts are faced with the inherent difficulty of trying to
apply ordinary concepts of tort law, which developed in the context of litigation between private
persons. to public entities.
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A municipality in a blanket-waiver state would be subject to potential
liability for erroneous issuance of buildingpermits in the absence of other
doctrines. Notwithstanding this blanket waiver of immunity, courts have
recognized the necessity of limiting liability. 53 As with open-ended acts,
these courts have often turned to the public duty doctrine as a "tool" to
limit liability. 54 Therefore, Preston may be unable to recover monetary
damages notwithstanding the blanket waiver of immunity.
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL TORT
LIABILITY
Prior to the abrogation of governmental immunity, courts had no cause
to apply traditional negligence concepts to a governmental tortfeasor. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the demise of sovereign immunity signalled
the application of traditional tort principles to governmental tortfeasors.
From this union, the public duty doctrine was born. 55 The doctrine is
Because of the government's unique role and function in society, the rationales which support tort
liability for private entities often do not support liability for public entities. Unlike a private individ-
ual, a municipality has mandatory duties to engage in numerous activities which it cannot refuse
simply because the risk of potential tort liability is too great. For example, public entities perform
functions for the public health and welfare which should be encouraged rather than discouraged by
the imposition of tort liability. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Rich v. City of Mobile, 410 So. 2d 385, 387-88 (Ala. 1982) (public service activi-
ties are "so laden with the public interest as to outweigh the incidental duty to individual citizens");
Georges v. Tudor, 16 Wn. App. 407, 410, 556 P.2d 564, 566-67 (1976) (municipality should not be
"a guarantor of each and every construction project").
54. See infra Part III.
55. This is best illustrated by the development of the public duty doctrine in New York, the first
state to abolish sovereign immunity. N.Y. C'. CL. ACr art. II, § 8 (McKinney 1963). The New York
tort claims act holds governmental entities to the same standards of tort liability as a private person.
Id. In response to the legislative failure to define the scope of governmental tort liability, the New
York courts developed the public duty doctrine.
In the seminal case of H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896
(1928), the plaintiff sued a public service corporation for negligently failing to supply sufficient water
to quell a fire on the plaintiff's premises. Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, found that the
claim did not state a cause of action because the failure to supply water for fire-fighting purposes was
a denial of a benefit owed to the general public, not to the individual plaintiff. Id. at 164-65, 159
N.E. at 897.
Subsequently, the New York courts applied the public duty doctrine to cases alleging negligent
building and fire inspection. For example, in Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204
N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965), the New York Court of Appeals held that the failure of a fire
captain to enforce the fire prevention code did not create a legal cause of action for a plaintiff injured
in a subsequent fire. The court based its finding of nonliability on the absense of a duty owed to the
individual plaintiff and not on any vestige of sovereign immunity. Id. at 637, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
As other states followed New York's lead in abolishing sovereign immunity, they also adopted the
New York courts' traditional formulation of the public duty doctrine. See, e.g., Duran v. City of
Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1973) (denying plaintiff's claim for negligent in-
spections by the city because the duty to enforce a law is owed to the general public and is not
actionable by any individual); Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199
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prevalent in those states which have adopted either an open-ended tort
claims act or have a blanket waiver of governmental immunity because
the legislatures failed to define the scope of governmental tort liability. 56
This legislative failure forces the courts to draw a line between denying
compensation to the victims of negligent public employees and unduly
interfering with the desirable purposes for which municipalities exist.
Most courts have attempted to shape the contours of governmental tort
liability in these states by applying the public duty doctrine. 57 In a few
states, however, courts have rejected the public duty doctrine and have
applied a foreseeability standard. 58 In general, governmental tort liability
for erroneous issuance of building permits reflects this division of author-
ity. Preston's recovery of damages, therefore, turns on whether the par-
ticular court applies the public duty doctrine or the foreseeability ap-
proach.
A. The Public Duty Doctrine
The public duty doctrine provides that a claimant who is alleging inad-
equate performance of a governmental activity has the burden to show
that the municipality owed a duty to the claimant and not solely to the
general public when performing the activity in question. 59 If the activity
is designed solely for the benefit of the general public, the cause of action
fails for lack of a legal duty owed to the claimant. 60
Under the public duty doctrine a municipality is generally not liable for
negligent issuance of building permits. Applying this doctrine, courts first
N.W.2d 158, 160 (1972) (affirming dismissal of a suit against the city for alleged negligence in
issuing a building permit because the plaintiffs failed to show a breach of some duty owed them in
their individual capacities).
56. See supra note 55. This is true to a lesser extent in states with open-ended acts. Open-ended
acts leave less room for courts to use the public duty doctrine because of the specific grants of immu-
nity. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973); Leger v.
Kelley, 19 Conn. Sup. 167, 110 A.2d 635 (1954), aff d, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429 (1955);
Hannon v. Counihan, 54 Il. App. 3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917 (1977); Grogan v. Commonwealth, 577
S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1979); Dinsky v. Town of Framingham, 386
Mass. 801,438 N.E.2d 51 (1982); Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 1981); Motyka v. City of
Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635, 256 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1965); Gordon v. Holt, 65
A.D.2d 344, 412 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1979); Baerlein v. State, 92 Wn. 2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979).
58. See infra note 76.
59. See, e.g., Hannon v. Counihan, 54 Il. App. 3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917, 921-22 (1977) (fail-
ure of municipality to properly enforce building codes did not give rise to a cause of action because
duty to enforce the codes was owed to the general public); Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 287
(Minn. 1981) (fire inspection statute protects the public as a whole and therefore plaintiffs had no
cause of action for alleged1 negligent performance of fire inspection duties). See generally supra note
55 (cases applying the public duty doctrine).
60. See supra note 59.
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look to the purpose of the building codes to determine whether the muni-
cipality owes a specific duty to the plaintiff.61 Traditionally, courts have
held that building codes are enacted for the benefit of the public and that
the issuance of building permits is merely a device to ensure compliance
with the building codes. 62 Therefore, a claimant's cause of action will fail
for the lack of a legal duty owed. Courts, however, have created two
limited exceptions in the public duty doctrine where the claimant estab-
lishes either: (1) a "clear intent" in the statute to benefit a particular class
of individuals, or (2) a "special relationship" with the municipality.
The first exception applies if the claimant can establish that the statute
reveals a "clear intent" to identify and protect a particular class of indi-
viduals and the claimant is within the protected class. 63 For example, in
Halvorson v. Dahl,64 the widow of a man killed in a hotel fire brought a
wrongful death action against the city alleging failure of the city to prop-
erly enforce the applicable housing codes. 65 The court found a "clear in-
tent" in the stated purpose of the housing code to protect the welfare of
building occupants. That purpose was to identify "conditions and cir-
cumstances [that] are dangerous and a menace to the health, safety, mor-
als or welfare of the occupants of such buildings and of the public.' 66
61. For example, in Dinsky v. Town of Framingham, 386 Mass. 801, 438 N.E.2d 51 (1982), the
plaintiffs sued the municipality alleging negligence in the issuance of building permits. The court first
looked at the State Building Code for language indicating a legislative intent to create private causes
of action for negligence in the issuance of building permits. Id. at 55. Relying on the stated purpose
of the code to "insure public safety, health, and welfare," the court held that there was no legislative
intent to impose a duty in favor of individual property owners. Id. at 55-56.
62. See, e.g., Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973); Hoffert v.
Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158 (1972); Rosen v. Tacoma, 24
Wn. App. 735, 603 P.2d 848 (1979). See generally 9 E. McQulLLN, supra note 14, § 26.200, at
507-08 (general purpose of building permits is to obtain compliance with the building codes).
63. See Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1978). Cf. Gordon v.
Holt, 65 A.D.2d 344, 412 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1979) (a city building code, similar to the one relied on in
Halvorson, was construed as declaring only a general duty to the public and not to the injured ten-
ants).
64. 89Wn. 2d673,574 P.2d 1190 (1978).
65. Id. at 677,574 P.2d at 1193.
66. SEArrtE, WASH., HousINt CODE § 27.04.020 (1978) (now codified as amended in scattered
sections of SATrLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 22.206 (1980)). The Code provides:
There exist, within the city of Seattle, dwellings and other buildings or portions thereof, occu-
pied or designed for human habitation together with appurtenant structures and premises, which
are unfit for human habitation, substandard, deteriorating, in danger of causing or contributing
to the creation of slums or otherwise blighted areas, and inimical to the health, safety and wel-
fare of the occupants thereof and of the public.
Such conditions and circumstances are dangerous and a menace to the health, safety, morals
or welfare of the occupants of such buildings and of the public, and accordingly it is the purpose
of this code to establish minimum standards and effective means for enforcement thereof for the
preservation, protection, and promotion of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
Id.
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Because of such "clear intent," the municipality was found to owe a duty
to the decedent.
Most building codes, though, are drafted to emphasize the benefit to
the "public safety, health, and welfare" and not the benefit to a particular
class of individuals. 67 Courts, therefore, must stretch the statutory lan-
guage in order to find a "clear intent" to benefit a particular class. Courts
have been unwilling to stretch the language of building codes, and claim-
ants have been unsuccessful in asserting a duty based on the statutory
language. 68
The second limited exception to the public duty doctrine applies where
a claimant can show a "special relationship" with the municipality.
Courts have found a "special relationship" where agents of a munici-
pality have knowledge of facts which constitute a statutory violation, a
private party relies on assurances that the situation will be corrected, and
the agents fail to take corrective action, causing an injury to the private
party. 69 The existence of a "special relationship" is best illustrated in
Campbell v. City of Bellevue. 70 In Campbell, the plaintiff requested an
inspection of the neighbor's premises after discovering an electric current
in a creek on nearby property. The city's electrical inspector found code
violations in the outdoor wiring strung through the creek and notified the
neighbor of the violations. The inspector, however, failed to initiate cor-
The Halvorson court concluded that the plaintiffs, as occupants of the building, were class mem-
bers and had stated a claim against the city upon which relief could be granted. 89 Wn. 2d at 677-78,
574 P.2d at 1193. The court noted, however, that the mere finding of a "clear intent" to protect a
particular class of persons does not support a claim against the city. Rather, the plaintiff must also
demonstrate culpable neglect by the city. Id. at 678-79, 574 P.2d at 1193. Thus, the Halvorson court
did not impose absolute liability upon the city for failing to secure perfect compliance with the hous-
ing code.
67. See, e.g., KING CouNtrY. WASH.. CODE § 21.02.010 (1981), which provides:
An official land use control ... is adopted and established to serve the public health, safety
and general welfare and to provide the economic and social and aesthetic advantages resulting
from an orderly planned use of land resources and represents one means of carrying out the
general purposes set forth and defined in the comprehensive plan of King County.
Although the Halvorson court found that the Seattle Housing Code evidenced a "clear intent" to
benefit a particular class of individuals, it also noted that "most codes are enacted merely for pur-
poses of public safety or for the general welfare." 89 Wn. 2d 673, 677, 574 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1978).
See supra note 65. By proper drafting of a code or ordinance, a municipality may be able to ensure
that it will be construed as benefitting the public generally.
68. This author knows of no case where an injured permit holder has successfully sought relief
for negligent issuance of a building permit based on the "clear intent" of the building code. See
supra note 62 (cases finding no "clear intent").
69. See Smullen v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66,268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1971);
Runkel v. City of New York, 282 A.D. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1953), affd and modified sub noma.
Runkel v. Homelsky, 286 A.D. 1101, 145 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1955), affd, 3 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d
23, 166 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1957); Campbell v. City of Bellevue, 85 Wn. 2d 1,530 P.2d 234 (1975),
rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Campbell v. Saunders, 86 Wn. 2d 572, 546 P.2d 922 (1976).
70. 85 Wn. 2d 1,530 P.2d 234 (1975).
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rective action. 71 The plaintiffs wife was later electrocuted while attempt-
ing to save her son, who had fallen into the "hot" creek. The plaintiff
claimed that the city was liable because the inspector had failed to prop-
erly enforce the city's electrical safety regulations. 72 Although recogniz-
ing the public duty doctrine, the court found a "special relationship" be-
tween the injured plaintiff and agents of the municipality. 73
Even though the "special relationship" exception gives a court greater
opportunity to impose a duty on the municipality running to the claimant,
courts have been reluctant to do so. Most courts have required additional
indicia of an undertaking by a government employee or some other ex-
traordinary circumstances. 74 An action for negligent issuance of a build-
ing permit rarely, if ever, presents to the court any extraordinary circum-
71. Id. at4,530P.2dat236.
72. Id. at 5,530 P.2d at 236.
73. Id. at 10, 530 P.2d at 239. Campbell, however, is one of the limited number of cases in
which a court has found a "special relationship." See infra notes 74-75.
74. Otherwise, the "special relationship" exception would emasculate the public duty doctrine.
A distillation of the principles underlying court decisions permitting recovery on the grounds of a
"special relationship" reveals several recurring factors.
First, when there is present an inherently dangerous or imminently hazardous condition, there is a
greater responsibility on the government to act properly. Compare Runkel v. City of New York, 282
A.D. 173, 123 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1953) affd and modified sub nom. Runkel v. Homelsky, 286 A.D.
1101, 145 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1955), aff d, 3 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d 23, 166 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1957)
(city held liable to plaintiffs buried in a collapsed building where city inspector had found building to
be dangerous, unsafe, in danger of collapse, and calling for demolition or securing, but took no
action) with Sanchez v. Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 366 N.E.2d 870, 397 N.Y.S.2d 782
(1977), modified, 44 N.Y.2d 817, 377 N.E.2d 748, 406 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1978) (court denied plain-
tiffs' action for wrongful death after a fire in a multiple dwelling alleging that the building inspector
was incompetent and the building violated statutes and ordinances because no "special relationship"
existed and the building was not found to be a dangerous instrumentality).
Second, if the danger presented is open, obvious, and requiring immediate government action, the
municipality bears a greater responsibility to the individual. Compare Schuster v. City of New York,
5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958) (city subject to liability for failure to
provide police protection where the police were notified that the decedent had received death threats
for having supplied information leading to the arrest of a well-known criminal) with Riss v. City of
New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968) (although plaintiff had re-
ceived threats and notified police, plaintiff had no cause of action against police when lye was thrown
in her face, blinding her, because the danger was not imminent and pressing).
Finally, if the individual claimant actually relies on the municipality's representations and conduct,
then the responsibilty of the municipality for the protection of the individual is increased. Compare
Smullen v. City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 66, 268 N.E.2d 763, 320 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1971) (city held
liable where blatant violations of code covering excavations existed, city inspector had told plaintiff's
decedent that the "trench was pretty solid there" and did not need to be shored, and the trench
collapsed) with Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973) (plaintiff's argu-
ment that he relied on the fire department to detect unsafe conditions held to be insufficient to estab-
lish a "special relationship").
When one or more of these principles is present a "special relationship" is likely to be found and
thereby impose a duty on a municipality running to the individual claimant.
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stances or any additional indicia of an undertaking necessary to support a
finding of a "special relationship. " 75
Because courts have construed the exceptions to the public duty doc-
trine very narrowly, the doctrine has become a very successful municipal
defense to tort liability. In most blanket-waiver states, therefore, Pres-
ton's action for negligent issuance of building permits will fail for lack of
a legal duty.
B. The Foreseeability Approach
The success of the public duty doctrine as a municipal defense has
caused a few courts to hold that the doctrine is a vestige of sovereign
immunity rather than a traditional negligence concept. 76 Accordingly,
these courts assert that the public duty doctrine is contrary to statutes
abolishing sovereign immunity and necessarily must be rejected. 77 Under
75. See supra note 74. For example, in Industrial Hydraulics v. Aberdeen, 27 Wn. App. 123,
619 P.2d 980 (1980), the holder of a building permit which violated a city building regulation
brought a negligence action against the city for damages arising from the city's revocation of the
permit. The court denied recovery because the building inspector simply missed the noncomformity
in issuing the building permit, and the plaintiff made no specific inquiry concerning the nonconform-
ing plans. Id. at 126, 619 P.2d at 982. Cf. Rodgers v. Toppenish, 23 Wn. App. 554, 560-61, 596
P.2d 1096, 1100 (1979), reh'g denied, 92 Wn. 2d 1030 (1979) (specific inquiries to the zoning
administrator concerning information solely within the knowledge of the zoning administrator held
sufficient to establish a "special relationship").
76. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian
River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979);
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74
Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
77. In the leading case of Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs could recover for the wrongful deaths of hotel guests proximately caused
by the state's negligent fire inspection. The Adams court did not reach the issue of whether the state
had a statutory duty. Id. at 240. Rather, the court found that the state had breached a common law
duty of care assumed as a result of its "affirmative conduct." Id.
The court found an assumed duty based on the evidence that: (1) the inspector had undertaken an
inspection of the hotel and had discovered several fire code violations; (2) the inspector had promised
the hotel owner a more formal notification of fire code violations and failed to do so; and (3) the
failure of the inspector to take the mandatory follow-up procedures increased the risk of harm to the
hotel owner, as well as to the occupants. Id.
The Adams court's decision to abrogate the public duty doctrine was predicated on the questionable
assumption that otherwise the plaintiffs would be without a remedy. This assumption was question-
able because the facts of the case support a finding of a "special relationship." See supra notes 69-74
and accompanying text.
The Adams analysis has influenced several other courts. For example, the Oregon Supreme Court
in Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719, 723-25 (1979), rejected the public duty
doctrine and imposed liability on the municipality for damages resulting from the negligent issuance
of a taxicab license to an applicant who lacked the minimum liability insurance required by municipal
ordinance. In so holding, the court rejected the municipality's argument that abolishing the public
duty doctrine would result in the municipality becoming an insurer of all its citizens. Id. But cf.
Georges v. Tudor, 16 Wn. App. 407, 410, 556 P.2d. 564, 566-67 (1976) (abolishing the public duty
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this minority position, courts define the scope of governmental duty in
terms of foreseeability. 78 If it is foreseeable that a government em-
ployee's negligent performance of a statutory duty might result in harm to
someone, then the municipality will be held liable. 79
Under this minority position, courts have held that the approval of a
building permit which does not comply with the applicable building and
zoning codes creates a foreseeable risk of harm to the permit holder. 80
Thus, a municipality owes a duty of due care to each and every permit
applicant, and a breach thereof will result in potential liability. This mi-
nority position, therefore, expands governmental tort liability beyond the
limits proscribed under the traditional public duty approach. Preston,
doctrine would cause the municipality to become "a guarantor of each and every construction proj-
ect").
More recently, in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1016 (Fla.
1979), the Florida Supreme Court held that the public duty doctrine, sovereign immunity, did not
survive Florida's recently enacted tort claims act.
78. See, e.g., Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); J & B Dev. Co. v.
King County, 29 Wn. App. 942, 631 P.2d 1002 (1981), review granted, 97 Wn. 2d 1001 (1982).
79. In Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976), the claimant, a
tenant of a building destroyed by fire, sued the city alleging that a negligent building inspection
caused the fire. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after rejecting the public duty doctrine, found that it
was foreseeable that a building inspector's negligence might result in harm to someone. Id. at 139.
The Coffey court, however, reserved the right to deny recovery on the ground of public policy if:
(I) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of propor-
tion to.the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly ex-
traordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of
recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or (5) because
allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allow-
ance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Id. at 140. By reserving this power, the court is, in effect, making the same determination as courts
which apply the public duty doctrine.
The Coffey policy considerations were subsequently applied in an action alleging negligent ap-
proval of a building permit and negligent inspection. Hawes v. Germantown Mutual Ins. Co., 103
Wis. 2d 524, 309 N.W.2d 356 (1981). In Hawes, the court held that "[plublic policy does not pre-
clude municipal liability for approval of plans and construction containing specific code violations
where the injury is directly attributable to easily discoverable violations." Id. at 363 (footnote omit-
ted).
80. See Dykeman v. State, 39 Or. App. 629, 593 P.2d 1183 (1979); J & B Dev. Co. v. King
County, 29 Wn. App. 942,631 P.2d 1002 (1981), review granted, 97Wn. 2d 1001 (1982). InJ&B,
the plaintiff's claim arose from the issuance of a building permit which did not comply with the local
zoning laws. The plaintiff began construction based on the permit only to have a stop-work order
issued later because the building did not comply with the zoning code. The plaintiff brought suit to
recover the costs of relocation.
The Washington Court of Appeals held that the county was liable in tort to private individuals for
negligently administering zoning and building codes. Id. at 955, 631 P.2d at 1010. In reaching this
conclusion, the court first rejected the public duty doctrine on the ground that it was inconsistent with
the blanket waiver of governmental immunity found in the Washington Tort Claims Act. Id. at 950,
631 P.2d at 1007. After rejecting the public duty doctrine, the court held that the issuance of permits
created a foreseeable risk of harm to the permit holder and thus the county owed a duty of care to the
plaintiff. Id. at 955, 631 P.2d at 1010.
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therefore, would probably recover monetary damages for erroneous issu-
ance of the building permit under the minority position.
C. Analysis of the Conflicting Positions
The minority position is premised on the perceived legislative purpose
behind blanket waiver tort claims acts: equating tort liability of public
entities with private entities. The minority position rejects the public duty
doctrine as inconsistent with this premise and subsitutes a foreseeability
test. Analysis reveals that the minority position is deficient in two re-
spects. First, the minority position wrongfully expands municipal tort lia-
bility beyond that imposed on private tortfeasors. Second, the expansion
of governmental tort liability resulting from adopting the minority posi-
tion is a poor public policy.
1. Consistency with Blanket Waiver Tort Claims Acts and Traditional
Tort Principles
Blanket-waiver and open-ended governmental tort claims acts make a
municipality generally liable for its torts "to the same extent as if [it]
were a private person or corporation.' '81 These statutes seek to subject
municipalities to the same common law tort principles applied to private
individuals. Although the minority position attempts to equate the tort
liability of municipalities with that of private individuals, examination of
standard tort principles reveals that the minority position actually expands
municipal liability beyond that of a similarly situated private individual. 82
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.010 (1981). See supra note 51 (listing states which have enacted
blanket-waiver acts).
82. A majority of courts have held that a blanket-waiver or open-ended act is not intended to
create any new causes of action aginst municipalities. See, e.g., Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz.
App. 22, 24, 509 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1973) ("Abrogation of the doctrine of governmental immunity
removes the defense of immunity, but does not create any new liability for a municipality."); Hannon
v. Counihan, 54 11. App. 3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917, 919 (1977) (Illinois Tort Immunity Act "does not
create any new liabilities for negligent acts or omissions which did not previously exist"); Grogan v.
Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Ky.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1979) (erasing the arbitrary
distinction between governmental and proprietary activities "did not purport to create new torts");
Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158, 159-60 (1972)
("[These statutory provisions merely removed the defense of immunity. They did not create any
new liability for a municipality."); LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn. 2d 154, 159, 531 P.2d 299, 302 (1975)
(provides a remedy, not a right to recover). But cf. Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa
1979) (special nature of Iowa statute abolishing governmental immunity construed as creating a new
cause of action).
Interestingly, the Federal Tort Claims Act is construed as involving "not the creation of new
causes of action but acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private liability into
existence." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).
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One of the prerequisites to a negligence action is a duty of care owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff.83 This duty of care may exist in common
law or be created by statute. In both instances, under orthodox tort princi-
ples, the defendant is not liable if the duty breached was owed to the
general public and not to a particular individual or class. 84 Under the mi-
nority position, however, a municipality would be liable to all permittees
regardless of whether the duty was owed solely to the general public.
Under the minority position, courts find that municipalities owe a com-
mon law duty to permit applicants based upon the applicant's foreseeable
reliance on the permit. 85 This position is intuitively appealing, as it mir-
rors hornbook law that liability exists when one undertakes to render ser-
vices for the protection of another if: (1) the failure to exercise reasonable
care increases the risk of harm, or (2) the harm is suffered because of the
other's reliance upon the undertaking. 86
Under this common law doctrine, the threshold determination is
whether one party has undertaken to render services to benefit another. 87
The minority position assumes that a local government, by enforcing its
building and zoning codes, is rendering a service for the benefit of the
particular party and not just for the general public. This assumption is
inconsistent with the purpose of building and zoning codes which is to
carry out the public will by regulating building and construction within
the community. 88 These codes secure to the community as a whole the
benefits of relatively safe structures and a well-ordered community
plan. 89 A local government issuing building permits is not undertaking to
83. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 30, at 143.
84. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 53, at 325 (quoting F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS
468 (13th ed. 1929) ("Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do.")).
85. See J & B Dev. v. King County, 29 Wn. App. 942, 952, 631 P.2d 1002, 1008 (1981),
review granted, 97 Wn. 2d 1001 (1982); supra note 80.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A (1965). The "special relationship" excep-
tion to the public duty doctrine is closely analogous to the position taken in § 323 of the Restatement.
See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
87. See Smith v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 685, 303 N.W.2d 702, 711 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 comment a (1965).
88. 18 E. McQuILuN, supra note 14, at 100.
89. See Haslund v. Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 607, 611 n.2, 547 P.2d 1221, 1224 n.2 (1976). See 9 E.
MCQUILLIN, supra note 14, § 26.200.
In order to secure this benefit, the local government must retain the right to inspect for compliance
and to revoke the building permit for noncompliance. See, e.g., KING COUNTY, WASH.. CODE §§
23.16.010, .020 (1981).
In Washington, the general rule is that a permit issued under a mistake of fact or in violation of the
law gives the permittee no vested rights and is revocable, regardless of the source and nature of the
defect. See Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., 82 Wn. 2d 475,483-84, 513 P.2d 36,
42 (1973); Nolan v. Blackwell, 123 Wash. 504, 505-06, 212 P. 1048, 1048-49 (1923). See gener-
ally Comment, Washington's Zoning Vested Rights Doctrine, 57 WASH. L. REV. 139, 143-44 (1981)
(discussing the sources and significance of a noncomplying permit).
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render a service to the permittee, but rather to protect the welfare of the
community. 90 Therefore, contrary to the minority position, a tort action
by a permittee based solely upon the municipality's issuance of permits
and inspection should fail for lack of a legal duty. 91
The minority position is also inconsistent with analogous cases involv-
ing private safety inspections. 92 In cases involving safety inspections by
private insurers, recovery turns on whether the private safety inspector
has undertaken to render a benefit to the insured. 93 Most courts hold that
mere performance of a safety inspection is insufficient to show that the
private safety inspector has undertaken to render a benefit to the in-
sured. 94 Applying the minority position to these cases would impose lia-
90. Provisions for permits and inspections are to enable enforcement of the laws; they are not a
benefit to a private developer. Instead of conferring a benefit, zoning and building codes act as a
limitation on the ability of a landowner to develop his or her property.
91. This assumes the absence of any additional indications of an undertaking to benefit the par-
ticular individual, either expressed in the ordinances or found in an assumption of a "special relation-
ship." See supra notes 67-68 & 74-75 and accompanying text.
92. Whether private safety inspection cases are relevant in governmental inspection cases is sub-
ject to dispute. The fundamental difference between the two is that private inspectors undertake in-
spections to lower the insurer's possibility of loss, whereas government inspectors conduct inspec-
tions to protect the public welfare. Compare Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 673 (Iowa 1979)
(court relied on cases holding private insurers who voluntarily inspect liable for negligent inspections
as support for holding municipalities liable for breach of statutory duties to inspect) with Grogan v.
Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 835 (1979) ("in delineating the
areas and extent of public responsibility we are dealing with a subject quite apart and different from
the world of individual and corporate relationships").
Logically, private inspectors should be held to a higher standard because they undertake inspec-
tions for pecuniary reasons. The minority position, however, does just the opposite.
93. See, e.g., Smith v. Allendale Mutual Ins., 410 Mich. 685, 303 N.W.2d 702, 711 (1981) and
authority cited therein.
94. See id. The approach taken in private inspection cases is similar to the approach taken to
determine whether a "special relationship" has arisen between a claimant and a municipality. Com-
pare Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d. 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964) (insurer held to have
undertaken to render a service to the insured when the evidence showed: regular and periodic inspec-
tions, reports and recommendations to the insured, and representations by the insurer that the insured
would receive extra safety benefits) and Hill v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 428 F.2d 112
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971) (insurer who carried fire insurance and worker's
compensation policies covering a hotel and who made periodic inspections and recommendations to
the hotel owners could be held liable for negligently conducted inspections) with Viducich v. Greater
New York Mutual Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596 (1963) (no recovery for an allegedly
negligent inspection when the insurer had conducted only one inspection of the machinery which
injured the plaintiff) and Smith v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 685, 303 N.W.2d 702, 706
(1981) ("An insurer's inspection of an insured's premises for fire hazards does not in itself demon-
strate an undertaking to render ... services to the insured.").
The reasons commonly given to support the requirement of additional conduct are: (1) public pol-
icy should encourage inspections because they reduce the number of injury-causing accidents, and (2)
imposing liability will substantially increase the premiums and not improve the safety of the prem-
ises. Smith v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 410 Mich. 685, 303 N.W.2d 702, 721 (1981).
Based on the same rationales, the federal courts have consistently held that mere acquiescence or
approval by a government inspector, without additional actions, is insufficient to impose liability
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bility on the private insurer because it is presumed that the insurer has
undertaken to render a benefit. The minority position, therefore, creates a
broader duty for local governments than for private parties, a result incon-
sistent with the legislative intent behind blanket waiver tort claims acts to
equate public liability with private liability. 95
In addition to unjustifiably expanding the common law duties of muni-
cipalities, the minority position also expands their statutory duties beyond
those imposed on private entities. In a tort action for breach of a statutory
duty between private parties the traditional common law rule is that a
statutory duty only extends to: (1) persons in the class protected by the
statute, and (2) persons harmed by a hazard the statute was intended to
prevent. 96 The scope of a statutory duty is dependent upon the language
and purpose of the statute. 97 Some statutes, although regulating public or
private conduct, create no duty toward any particular class of individu-
als. 98 These statutes protect only the interests of the state or the commu-
nity at large. Therefore; in an action involving only private parties, if the
statute's exclusive purpose is to secure a public benefit, then it does not
create a duty enforceable in tort by any particular class of individuals.99
upon the government. See Beason v. United States, 396 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1968); Roberson v. United
States, 382 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967); Lipka v. United States, 369 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1966); Lewis v.
United States, 501 F. Supp. 39 (D. Nev. 1980); Johnson v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 991 (N.D.
Fla. 1978).
95. See supra note 82.
96. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 190-97. This Comment will discuss only the first limita-
tion on the scope of a statutory duty because the public duty doctrine derives, in part, from this
limitation.
97. Id. at 191.
98. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
The court will not adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively
(a) to protect the interests of the state or any subdivision of it as such, or
(b) to secure to individuals the enjoyment of rights or privileges to which they are entitled
only as members of the public, or
(c) to impose upon the actor the performance of a service which the state or any subdivision of
it undertakes to give the public.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 192 (illustra-
tions of statutes which afford no basis for the creation of a duty of due care toward any particular
person).
99. A common example is a municipal snow removal ordinance. This type of ordinance typically
requires the owner or occupier of a building to clear the abutting public sidewalks of snow and ice. A
person injured by falling on an ice-covered sidewalk that the abutting owner failed to keep clear does
not have a cause of action against the property owner based on the municipal ordinance. The rationale
behind denying the injured plaintiff a cause of action against the private defendant is that snow re-
moval ordinances are enacted for the benefit of the municipality as an entity. See, e.g., Gardner v.
Kendrick, 7 Wn. App. 852, 503 P.2d 134 (1972). See generally -Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 998 (1962)
(discussion of cases addressing the issue of tort liability for failure to comply with municipal snow
removal ordinances).
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To effectuate the legislative intent to equate governmental and private
tort liability, the same statutory duty principles should logically apply to
both public and private defendants. The public duty doctrine accom-
plishes this result. Under the public duty doctrine, courts first look at the
statute for evidence of legislative intent to protect a particular class, and
finding none, refuse to impose liability on a municipality. 100 Under the
minority position, on the other hand, courts do not analyze the language
of the building code. Rather these courts hold that the language and pur-
pose of the code are immaterial, as the existing public duty is held to be a
private duty as well. 101 This result clearly extends governmental liability
beyond traditional tort boundaries, in effect creating a new cause of ac-
tion when there is a public defendant.
The minority position, therefore, is inconsistent with a blanket waiver
of governmental immunity because it expands tort liability beyond that
imposed on private tortfeasors. The public duty doctrine, on the other
hand, complies with traditional tort principles and thus fulfills the legisla-
tive intent.
2. Public Policy Considerations
Public policy considerations are of primary importance in establishing
a duty of due care. As one commentator has noted: "[i]t should be recog-
nized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 102 The minority position
emphasizes two policy considerations in support of expanding govern-
mental tort liability. The first is that governmental tort liability will deter
government officials and employees from approaching their duties "fri-
volously." 103 The second is that it is undesirable to place the risk of er-
roneous permit issuance on the developer. 104 A more complete analysis,
100. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
101. In J & B Dev. v. King County, 29 Wn. App. 942, 631 P.2d 1002 (1981), review granted,
97 Wn. 2d 1001 (1982), for example, the court held that the plaintiff had a cause of action against the
county notwithstanding the stated purpose of the King County Code to "serve the public health,
safety, and general welfare." Id. at 951, 631 P.2d at 1008. The J & B court did not, as required by
traditional tort principles, analyze the language of the code to determine whether the code is designed
to benefit a particular class of persons or whether it is designed to benefit the general public.
102. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 325-26. See Haslund v. Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 607, 611-12, 547
P.2d 1221, 1224-25 (1976).
103. J & B Dev. v. King County, 29 Wn. App. 942, 955, 631 P.2d 1002, 1010 (1981), review
granted, 97 Wn. 2d 1001 (1982). See Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351, 1357 (La. 1980).
104. J & B Dev. v. King County, 29 Wn. App. 942, 955, 631 P.2d 1002, 1010 (1981), review
granted, 97 Wn. 2d 1001 (1982).
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however, reveals that neither policy consideration justifies establishing a
duty owed by local governments to building permit applicants.
First, it is questionable whether tort liability will deter governmental
officials from approaching their jobs "frivolously." Although some com-
mentators have argued that tort liability will lead municipalities to up-
grade their training programs and better supervise existing activities, 105
this result is unlikely to materialize. Implicit in the minority's reasoning
is the assumption that local governments are financially able to upgrade
their permit and inspection departments. This assumption is questionable.
The costs of expanding their departments and training programs could be
extremely high. 106 It is unlikely that the funds necessary for such pro-
grams will be available because of the fiscal problems currently facing
many municipalities.
Local governments would then face a dilemma because of their unique
position in administering building and zoning codes. On the one hand,
local governments have an unavoidable legal duty to process building
permit applications, despite the accompanying risk of liability. 10 7 Thus,
the municipality would face the prospect of expansive tort liability. On
the other hand, because of the voters' refusal to authorize adequate reve-
nues, the municipality would lack the -finances to upgrade programs in
order to avoid liability. Such fiscal constraints will limit the courts' ability
lo deter "frivolous" government action.
105. Several commentators have argued that the most promising way to effectuate responsible
municipal actions is to impose liability on the governmental unit. See Note, State Tort Liability for
Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 350 (1977); Note, Municipal Corpo-
rations-Tort Liability-Municipality Held Not Liable for Negligent Inspection Absent a Special
Duty to Individual Members of the Public, 3 HAMLINE L. REv. 231, 240 (1980).
106. Many municipalities use spot enforcement systems to check compliance with building per-
mits. These systems are designed to detect as many violations as possible subject to the manpower
and budgetary restraints on the local government; they are not designed to detect every violation. The
minority position, however, makes the spot enforcement system inadequate to satisfy the obligation
imposed upon the local government. Under the minority position, the municipality will, in effect, be
required to ensure that all building permits are in compliance with the applicable codes and ordi-
nances. In order to meet this burden, municipalities will have to hire additional personnel which will
result in higher payroll expenses.
107. When a builder submits a permit application that complies with the applicable building and
zoning ordinances, the builder has a legal right to the permit and can secure a writ of mandamus to
compel the municipality to issue it. See 3 A. RATHKori, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §
44.05(4) (1975).
In this respect, local governments differ from private entities. A private insurance company, for
example, can independently appraise the potential risk involved in conducting safety inspections
compared to the potential savings from fewer claims and choose whether to act or not. This option is
unavailable to local governments which have a legal duty to act once a zoning or building code is
enacted. Furthermore, most municipalities have adopted some type of building or zoning code and
are politically unable to abandon such codes because they have become an integral part of the com-
munity's development.
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Second, the risk of erroneous permit issuance properly falls on the dev-
eloper. Developers are under a legal duty to comply with the relevant
building and zoning codes in their permit applications. 08 The local gov-
ernment's duty is merely secondary: to encourage the developer to volun-
tarily comply with the applicable building and zoning codes. The risk of
erroneous permit issuance must fall on the developer in order to provide
an economic incentive to initially comply with the codes. Under the mi-
nority position, this incentive is removed from the developer and the pri-
mary responsibility to insure compliance is shifted to the municipality.
This shift in responsibility provides an economic disincentive to private
contractors to conduct their own examination of the building and zoning
codes. Instead, developers can rely on the municipality to insure that the
permit application complies with all relevant codes and ordinances, se-
cure in the knowledge that if the public official failed to discover all the
errors in the submitted application, the developer would be indemnified
for any resulting losses. 109 This result clearly places an unreasonable bur-
den on a municipality in light of the socially desirable goals accomplished
by permit issuance and inspection. 110 Therefore, the policy rationales po-
sited by courts do not support the expansion of tort liability under the
minority approach.
In summary, the minority position is inconsistent with its basic pur-
pose: to equate governmental tort liability with that of similarly situated
private individuals. Rather than equating tort liability, the minority posi-
tion creates new causes of action when a governmental entity is a defen-
dant, a result not envisioned by the state legislatures when enacting blan-
ket-waiver tort claims acts.III The public duty doctrine, on the other
hand, is consistent with a blanket waiver of governmental immunity be-
cause it extends traditional tort principles to actions against municipali-
ties. By applying the doctrine, courts are able to effectuate the legisla-
ture's intent to treat governmental and private tortfeasors equally.
108. See supra note 89 (an invalid permit vests no rights in the developer).
109. See Hannon v. Counihan, 54 I11. App. 3d 509, 369 N.E.2d 917, 922 (1977); Hoffert v.
Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1972); Georges v. Tudor,
16 Wn. App. 407, 410, 556 P.2d 564, 566-67 (1976).
110. In addition, a separation of powers problem could arise under the minority position. By
applying a "reasonableness" test, courts would be forced to supervise the operations of local govem-
ment. For example, some of the issues the courts would be forced to decide are: (I) how many
persons should be assigned to the permit department; (2) how many persons are required to enforce
permits; and (3) what should be the requisite training and education of such persons. These determi-
nations are beyond the proper role of the judiciary and are best made by the local government to
which they are committed.
I 11. See supra note 82.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A comparison of decisions under the specific and well-defined closed-
ended tort claims acts with decisions under the general and undefined
blanket-waiver approach yields interesting results. In general, the courts
in blanket-waiver states have limited the scope of government liability
almost to the same extent as those in closed-ended states. The courts
reached this result by using the public duty doctrine.
Despite reaching nearly the same results, the application of the public
duty doctrine has created several problems for municipal planners. First,
the lack of explicit legislative limitations coupled with an undefined statu-
tory or judicial waiver of governmental immunity has resulted in numer-
ous judicial exceptions 112 and conflicting opinions.113 Because of the un-
certain and unsettled scope of governmental tort liability in these states, it
is difficult, if not impossible, for municipalities to properly allocate their
limited fiscal resources. The absence of specific liability limits creates
new costs for municipalities: costs not only in the form of tort judgments
but also costs from claim payments, investigation and litigation expenses,
and the unknown costs of services foregone because of the uncertain
scope of governmental liability. 114
Some commentators argue that this burden can be spread effectively
over the entire community through the use of liability insurance. 115 Ade-
quate insurance, however, is often unavailable or unaffordable. 116 Insur-
ance companies are unwilling to insure municipalities because of the un-
certain and unascertainable scope of potential tort liability. 117 This
uncertainty has been increased by the recent decisions rejecting the public
duty doctrine and expanding governmental tort liability. 18 At a mini-
mum, the insurance companies will charge extremely high rates to com-
pensate for the uncertainty. Because municipalities have limited revenue
112. See generally supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text (discussing the exceptions to the
public duty doctrine).
113. See generally supra Part IIIB (recent decisions rejecting the public duty doctrine have added
to the uncertainty surrounding the scope of municipal tort liability).
114. Smith, Insurance and the Texas Tort Claims Act, 49 TEx. L. REv. 445,449 (1971).
115. See Note, State Tort Liabilityfor Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 COLUM. L.J. & Soc. PROBS.
303,346 (1977).
116. Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It Inter-
fere with the Performance of State andLocal Government? 13 URB. L. 1, 20 (Wtr. 1981).
117., In the insurance industry, making a profit depends on the long-range certainty of income
exceeding payments. Because the scope of governmental liability is uncertain in blanket-waiver
states, insurance companies are naturally reluctant to insure municipalities. See id.; Smith, supra
note 114, at 450; Vitullo & Peters, Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Municipal Insurance
Crisis, 30 DEPAUL L. REv. 325, 329 (1981).
118. See supra Part 1IIB.
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sources, they would be forced either to decrease social services or to in-
crease local taxes. 119
Only a comprehensive legislative plan outlining the contours of gov-
ernmental tort liability will ameliorate these problems. This Comment
recommends the closed-ended approach. This approach is superior in sev-
eral respects.
First, by preventing courts from adopting "novel causes of action,"
the closed-ended approach fosters greater certainty in the area of munici-
pal tort liability. 120 Decisions regarding liability are made on a firm statu-
tory base rather than on a case-by-case judicial interpretation. This, in
turn, leads to greater predictability of governmental liability which will
allow municipalities to obtain realistically priced insurance and to prop-
erly budget for potential liabilities.
Second, under this approach, the legislature weighs all the competing
policy considerations for imposing liability on specific governmental ac-
tivities. The legislature, through its use of committee hearings and re-
ports, is in the best position to consider the broad ramifications of restrict-
ing or expanding governmental tort liability.
Third, the specific detailed exceptions found in a closed-ended tort
claims act protect a municipality from the need to insure against other
unspecified risks. The detailed exceptions also serve to avoid expensive
litigation over the scope of governmental tort liability. Finally, the de-
tailed exceptions provide guidelines for a municipality when considering
to undertake additional activities to further the public welfare.
This Comment advocates that municipalities should be immune from
tort liability for issuing building permits. Building permit enforcement
secures a safe and well ordered community which benefits the public in
general. Therefore, it should be encouraged rather than discouraged by
the imposition of tort liability. An individual injured by the negligent is-
suance of a building permit has other methods of recourse through exist-
ing administrative or judicial proceedings.'12 Balancing the equities be-
119. See Jaron, supra note 116, at 20; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Pol-
icy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 472 (1963); Note, Municipal Tort Liability: A Legislative
Solution Balancing the Needs of City and Plaintiffs, 16 URB. L. ANN. 305, 305 n.5 (1979).
This problem is avoided, to a small extent, in those states which have imposed statutory limits on
tort recoveries against municipalities. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1979); ILL REV. STAT ch.
85, § 2-102 (1975); MINN. STAT. § 466.04 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.270(1) (1977); Wis STAT §
893.80(3) (Supp. 1982). Although the amount of a claim of a single individual or a claim arising out
of a single occurrence is limited by statute, it is still uncertain when and how often a municipality will
be subject to tort liability in blanket-waiver states. It appears, therefore, that liability limits are not the
answer to the dilemma facing local governmental entities.
120. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-1 comment (1982).
121. A number of jurisdictions have held that a municipality is estopped from revoking a build-
ing permit when an official, acting within the scope of his or her authority, has issued a permit by
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tween the injured individual and the social utility of building permit
enforcement, therefore, weighs in favor of governmental immunity.
Scott J. Borth
563
mistake. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. County of Cook, 71 111. App. 3d 510, 377
N.E.2d 21 (1978); Key Petroleum, Inc. v. Housing Auth., 357 So. 2d 920 (Miss. 1977). A permit
holder also has a right to have the stop-work order reviewed by a board of appeals. See 4 A. RATH-
KOFF, supra note 107, § 49.09.
